1. Pass legal clarifications to substantive patent law. Such clarifications comprise negative and positive tests for patent examiners to assess what is eligible to merit a patent. We made proposals and remain open to alternatives that contribute to the end of software patenting worldwide. Two major ones are:
    1. A claimed object that consists only of instructions for use of generic data processing hardware (universal computer), also called “program for computers” or “computer-implemented solution”, is not an invention in the sense of patent law, regardless of the form in which it is claimed.
    2. A claimed object can be an invention in the sense of patent law only if it contributes knowledge to the state of the art in a field of applied natural science.
  2. Overcome a patent reform discussion trapped into "non-obviousness" The 'American disease' of patent law requires a return to real steering instruments. The patent community has been using that obviousness filter to distract reforms and to get industry backing for dismantling of more meaningful examination filters.
  3. Apply sound economical justifications and impact assessments in a democratic legislative process.
  4. Apply democratic reforms of patent institutions. Patent offices have to stay neutral and abstain from lobbying. They must let patent examiners contribute their first hand experiences. Persuasion for patenting based on the assumption that small enterprises just lack awareness puts preconceptions over the rationale of market choice.
  5. Provide for non-infringement declarations which override enforcement of patents. Rather than you taking the risk to research patents, patent holders should declare upon you request if your product or standard infringes one of their patents. Such estoppal provides legal certainty and standard confidence.
  6. Get patent professionals out of policy making. Increase the influence exercised by economists on the governance of innovation policy. The quality of professional judges cannot be exchanged for 'technical judges' without legal training and eligibility to a judicial office or administrative 'case law'.
  7. Keep substantive patent law harmonisation away from Free Trade Agreements.
  8. Start an open debate about the patent crisis aimed at finding solutions. Economists can easily explain to you why free rider effects make patent opposition suboptimal. Other institutional unbalances pressure patent examiners to grant permissively. Let's review the institutional incentives and start reform.